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Abstract
Carefully crafted, often imperceptible, adversarial
perturbations have been shown to cause state-of-
the-art models to yield extremely inaccurate out-
puts, rendering them unsuitable for safety-critical
application domains. In addition, recent work has
shown that constraining the attack space to a low
frequency regime is particularly effective. Yet, it
remains unclear whether this is due to generally
constraining the attack search space or specifically
removing high frequency components from con-
sideration. By systematically controlling the fre-
quency components of the perturbation, evaluating
against the top-placing defense submissions in the
NeurIPS 2017 competition, we empirically show
that performance improvements in both the white-
box and black-box transfer settings are yielded only
when low frequency components are preserved.
In fact, the defended models based on adversar-
ial training are roughly as vulnerable to low fre-
quency perturbations as undefended models, sug-
gesting that the purported robustness of state-of-
the-art ImageNet defenses is reliant upon adver-
sarial perturbations being high frequency in nature.
We do find that under `∞  = 16/255, the competi-
tion distortion bound, low frequency perturbations
are indeed perceptible. This questions the use of the
`∞-norm, in particular, as a distortion metric, and,
in turn, suggests that explicitly considering the fre-
quency space is promising for learning robust mod-
els which better align with human perception.
1 Introduction
Despite the impressive performance deep neural networks
have shown, researchers have discovered that they are, in
some sense, ‘brittle’; small carefully crafted ‘adversarial’ per-
turbations to their inputs can result in wildly different outputs
[Szegedy et al., 2013]. Even worse, these perturbations have
been shown to transfer: learned models can be successfully
manipulated by adversarial perturbations generated by attack-
ing distinct models. An attacker can discover a model’s vul-
nerabilities even without access to it.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship
between a perturbation’s frequency properties and its effec-
tiveness, and is motivated by recent work showing the effec-
tiveness of low frequency perturbations in particular. Guo
et al. [2018] shows that constraining the perturbation to the
low frequency subspace improves the query efficiency of the
decision-based gradient-free boundary attack [Brendel et al.,
2017]. Zhou et al. [2018] achieves improved transferability
by suppressing high frequency components of the perturba-
tion. Similarly, Sharma et al. [2018] applied a 2D Gaussian
filter on the gradient w.r.t. the input image during the iterative
optimization process to win the CAAD 2018 competition1.
However, two questions still remain unanswered:
1. is the effectiveness of low frequency perturbations sim-
ply due to the reduced search space or specifically due
to the use of low frequency components? and
2. under what conditions are low frequency perturbations
more effective than unconstrained perturbations?
To answer these questions, we design systematic exper-
iments to test the effectiveness of perturbations manipulat-
ing specified frequency components, utilizing the discrete co-
sine transform (DCT). Testing against state-of-the-art Ima-
geNet [Deng et al., 2009] defense methods, we show that,
when perturbations are constrained to the low frequency sub-
space, they are 1) generated faster; and are 2) more trans-
ferable. These results mirror the performance obtained when
applying spatial smoothing or downsampling-upsampling op-
erations. However, if perturbations are constrained to other
frequency subspaces, they perform worse in general. This
confirms that the effectiveness of low frequency perturbations
is due to the application of a low-pass filter in the frequency
domain of the perturbation rather than a general reduction in
the dimensionality of the search space.
On the other hand, we also notice that the improved effec-
tiveness of low frequency perturbations is only significant for
defended models, but not for clean models. In fact, the state-
of-the-art ImageNet defenses in test are roughly as vulner-
able to low frequency perturbations as undefended models,
suggesting that their purported robustness is reliant upon the
assumption that adversarial perturbations are high frequency
1Competition on Adversarial Attacks and Defenses: http://hof.
geekpwn.org/caad/en/index.html
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in nature. As we show, this issue is not shared by the state-of-
the-art on CIFAR-10 [Madry et al., 2017], as the dataset is too
low-dimensional for there to be a diverse frequency spectrum.
Finally, based on the perceptual difference between the un-
constrained and low frequency attacks, we discuss the prob-
lem of using the commonly used `∞ norm as a perceptual
metric for quantifying robustness, illustrating the promise in
utilizing frequency properties to learn robust models which
better align with human perception.
2 Background
Generating adversarial examples is an optimization problem,
while generating transferable adversarial examples is a gener-
alization problem. The optimization variable is the perturba-
tion, and the objective is to fool the model, while constrain-
ing (or minimizing) the magnitude of the perturbation. `p
norms are typically used to quantify the strength of the per-
turbation; though they are well known to be poor perceptual
metrics [Zhang et al., 2018]. Constraint magnitudes used in
practice are assumed to be small enough such that the ball is
a subset of the imperceptible region.
Adversarial perturbations can be crafted in not only the
white-box setting [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Chen et al.,
2017a] but in limited access settings as well [Chen et al.,
2017b; Alzantot et al., 2018a], when solely query access is al-
lowed. When even that is not possible, attacks operate in the
black-box setting, and must rely on transferability. Finally,
adversarial perturbations are not a continuous phenomenon,
recent work has shown applications in discrete settings (e.g.
natural language) [Alzantot et al., 2018b; Lei et al., 2018].
Numerous approaches have been proposed as defenses, to
limited success. Many have been found to be easily circum-
vented [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a; Sharma and Chen, 2018;
Athalye et al., 2018], while others have been unable to scale
to high-dimensional complex datasets, e.g. ImageNet [Smith
and Gal, 2018; Papernot and McDaniel, 2018; Li et al., 2018;
Schott et al., 2018]. Adversarial training, training the model
with adversarial examples [Goodfellow et al., 2014; Trame`r
et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2017; Ding et al., 2018], has
demonstrated improvement, but is limited to the properties
of the perturbations used, e.g. training exclusively on `∞
does not provide robustness to perturbations generated under
other distortion metrics [Sharma and Chen, 2017; Schott et
al., 2018]. In the NeurIPS 2017 ImageNet competition, win-
ning defenses built upon these trained models to reduce their
vulnerabilities [Kurakin et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018].
3 Methods
3.1 Attacks
We consider `∞-norm constrained perturbations, where the
perturbation δ satisfies ‖δ‖∞ ≤  with  being the maxi-
mum perturbation magnitude, as the NeurIPS 2017 competi-
tion bounded δ with  = 16. The Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2014] provides a simple, one-
step gradient-based perturbation of `∞  size as follows:
δFGSM = s ·  · sign(∇xJ(x, y)) (1)
DCT_Low DCT_Mid DCT_High DCT_Random
Figure 1: Masks used to constrain the frequency space where n =
128 and d = 299 (ImageNet). Red denotes frequency components
of the perturbation which will be masked when generating the ad-
versarial example, both during and after the optimization process.
Cln 1 [InceptionV3]
Cln 3
[InceptionV3, InceptionV4,
ResNetV2 101]
Adv 1 [AdvInceptionV3]
Adv 3
[AdvInceptionV3, Ens3AdvInceptionV3,
Ens4AdvInceptionV4]
Table 1: Models used for generating black-box transfer attacks.
where x is the input image, J is the classification loss func-
tion, sign(·) is the element-wise sign function2. When y is the
true label of x and s = +1, δ is the non-targeted attack for
misclassification; when y is a target label other than the true
label of x and s = −1, δ is the targeted attack for manipulat-
ing the network to wrongly predict y.
FGSM suffers from an “underfitting” problem when ap-
plied to non-linear loss function, as its formulation is de-
pendent on a linearization of J about x. The Basic Iterative
Method (BIM) [Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017], oth-
erwise known as PGD (without random starts), runs FGSM
for multiple iterations to rectify this problem. The top-placing
attack in the previously mentioned NeurIPS 2017 competi-
tion, the Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) [Dong et al.,
2017], replaces the gradient ∇xJ(x, y) with a “momentum”
term to prevent the “overfitting” problem, caused by poor lo-
cal optima, in order to improve transferability. Thus, we use
this method for our NeurIPS 2017 defense evaluation.
3.2 Frequency Constraints
Our goal is to examine whether the effectiveness of low fre-
quency perturbations is due to a reduced search space in gen-
eral or due to the specific use of a low-pass filter in the fre-
quency domain of the perturbation. To achieve this, we use
the discrete cosine transform (DCT) [Rao and Yip, 2014] to
constrain the perturbation to only modify certain frequency
components of the input.
The DCT decomposes a signal into cosine wave compo-
nents with different frequencies and amplitudes. Given a 2D
image (or perturbation) x ∈ Rd×d, the DCT Transform of x
is v = DCT(x), where the entry vi,j is the magnitude of its
corresponding basis functions.
The numerical values of i and j represent the frequen-
cies, i.e. smaller values represent lower frequencies and
vice versa. The DCT is invertible, with an inverse transform
2sign = 1 if x > 0, sign = −1 if x < 0, sign = 0, if x = 0.
x = IDCT(v)3.
We remove certain frequency components of the perturba-
tion δ by applying a mask to its DCT transform DCT(δ).
We then reconstruct the perturbation by applying IDCT on
the masked DCT transform. Specifically, the mask, m ∈
{0, 1}d×d, is a 2D matrix image whose pixel values are 0’s
and 1’s, and the “masking” is done by element-wise product.
We can then reconstruct the “transformed” perturbation by
applying the IDCT to the masked DCT(δ). The entire trans-
formation can then be represented as:
FreqMask(δ) = IDCT(Mask(DCT(δ))) . (2)
Accordingly in our attack, we use the following gradient
∇δJ(x+ FreqMask(δ), y) .
We use 4 different types of FreqMask to constrain the
perturbations, as shown in Figure 1. DCT High only pre-
serves high frequency components; DCT Low only preserves
low frequency components; DCT Mid only preserves mid
frequency components; and DCT Rand preserves randomly
sampled components. For reduced dimensionality n, we pre-
serve n×n components. Recall that v = DCT(x), DCT Low
preserves components vi,j if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n; DCT High
masks components if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ √d2 − n2; DCT Mid and
DCT Rand also preserve n×n components, the detailed gen-
eration processes can be found in the appendix. Figure 1
visualizes the masks when d = 299 (e.g. ImageNet) and
n = 128. Note that when n = 128, we only preserve
1282/2992 ≈ 18.3% of the frequency components, a small
fraction of the original unconstrained perturbation.
4 Results and Analyses
To evaluate the effectiveness of perturbations under different
frequency constraints, we test against models and defenses
from the NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks and Defences
Competition [Kurakin et al., 2018].
Threat Models: We evaluate attacks in both the non-
targeted and targeted case, and measure the attack success
rate (ASR) on 1000 test examples from the NeurIPS 2017 de-
velopment toolkit4. We test on  = 16/255 (competition dis-
tortion bound) and iterations = [1, 10] for the non-targeted
case;  = 32/255 and iterations = 10 for the targeted case.
The magnitude for the targeted case is larger since targeted
attacks, particularly on ImageNet (1000 classes), are signif-
icantly harder. As can be seen in Figure 5 and 6, uncon-
strained adversarial perturbations generated under these dis-
tortion bounds are still imperceptible.
Attacks: As described in Section 3, we experiment with the
original unconstrained MIM and frequency constrained MIM
with masks shown in Figure 1. For each mask type, we test
n = [256, 128, 64, 32] with d = 299. For DCT Rand, we
average results over 3 random seeds.
To describe the attack settings, we specify model place-
holders A and B. We call an attack white-box, when we at-
tack model A with the perturbation generated from A itself.
3DCT / IDCT is applied to each color channel independently.
4https://www.kaggle.com/c/6864/download/dev toolkit.zip
We call an attack grey-box, when the perturbation is generated
from A, but used to attack a “defended” A, where a defense
module is prepended toA. We call an attack black-box (trans-
fer), when the perturbation generated fromA is used to attack
distinct B, where B can be defended or not. Note that this is
distinct from the black-box setting discussed in [Guo et al.,
2018], in which query access is allowed.
Target Models and Defenses for Evaluation: We evalu-
ate each of the attack settings against the top defense solu-
tions in the NeurIPS 2017 competition [Kurakin et al., 2018].
Each of the top-4 NeurIPS 2017 defenses prepend a tuned
(or trained) preprocessor to an ensemble of classifiers, which
for all of them included the strongest available adversarially
trained model: EnsAdvInceptionResNetV25 [Trame`r
et al., 2017]. Thus, we use EnsAdvInceptionResNetV2
to benchmark the robustness6 of adversarially trained models.
We then prepend the preprocessors from the top-4 NeurIPS
2017 defenses to EnsAdvInceptionResNetV2, and de-
note the defended models as D1, D2, D3, and D4, respec-
tively. Regarding the preprocessors, D1 uses a trained de-
noiser where the loss function is defined as the difference be-
tween the target model’s outputs activated by the clean im-
age and denoised image [Liao et al., 2017]; D2 uses random
resizing and random padding [Xie et al., 2017]; D3 uses a
number of image transformations: shear, shift, zoom, and ro-
tation [Thomas and Elibol, 2017]; and D4 simply uses median
smoothing [Kurakin et al., 2018].
For our representative cleanly trained model, we evaluate
against the state-of-the-art NasNetLarge 3317 [Zoph et
al., 2017]. We denote EnsAdvInceptionResNetV2 as
EnvAdv and NasNetLarge 331 as NasNet for brevity.
Source Models for Perturbation Generation: For white-
box attacks, we evaluate perturbations generated from Nas-
Net and EnsAdv to attack themselves respectively. For grey-
box attacks, we use perturbations generated from EnsAdv to
attack D1, D2, D3, and D4 respectively. For black-box at-
tacks, since the models for generating the perturbations need
to be distinct from the ones being attacked, we use 4 different
sources (ensembles) which vary in ensemble size and whether
the models are adversarially trained or cleanly trained, as
shown in Table 1. In summary, for black-box attacks, per-
turbations generated from Adv 1, Adv 3, Cln 1, and Cln 3
are used to attack NasNet, EnsAdv, D1, D2, D3, and D4.
4.1 Overview of the Results
As described, we test the unconstrained and constrained per-
turbations in the white-box, grey-box, and black-box scenar-
ios. Representative results are shown in Figure 2a, 2b, 2c,
and 2d. In each of these plots, the vertical axis is attack
success rate (ASR), while the horizontal indicates the num-
ber of frequency components kept (Dimensionality). Un-
constrained MIM is shown as a horizontal line across the
dimensionality axis for ease of comparison. In each fig-
ure, the plots are, from left to right, non-targeted attack with
5https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/
adv imagenet models
6EnsAdvInceptionResNetV2 is to be attacked.
7https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/slim
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(a) White-box attack on adversarially trained model, EnsAdv.
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(b) White-box attack on standard cleanly trained model, NasNet.
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(c) Grey-box attack on top-4 NeurIPS 2017 defenses prepended to
adversarially trained model.
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(d)Black-box attack on sources (Table 1) transferred to defenses (En-
sAdv + D1∼4)
Figure 2: Number of iterations in parentheses. Non-targeted with  = 16/255, targeted with  = 32/255.
iterations = 1, non-targeted with iterations = 10, and tar-
geted with iterations = 10. From these figures, we can see
that DCT Low always outperforms the other frequency con-
straints, including DCT High, DCT Mid and DCT Rand.
In the appendix, we show results where the perturba-
tion is constrained using a spatial smoothing filter or a
downsampling-upsampling filter (perturbation resized with
bilinear interpolation). The performance mirrors that of Fig-
ure 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, further confirming that the effective-
ness of low frequency perturbations is not due to a general re-
striction of search space, but due to the low frequency regime
itself. Thus, in our remaining experiments, we focus on low
frequency constrained perturbations induced with DCT Low.
We compare ASR and relative changes across all black-
box transfer pairs between standard unconstrained MIM and
MIM constrained with DCT Low n = 128, on non-targeted
attacks with both iterations = 1 and iterations = 10. This
comparison is visualized in Figure 3 and 4. We also show
that these results do not transfer to the significantly lower-
dimensional CIFAR-10 dataset (d = 32, minimum n used
in ImageNet experiments), as the rich frequency spectrum of
natural images is no longer present.
4.2 Observations and Analyses
DCT Low generates effective perturbations faster on ad-
versarially trained models, but not on cleanly trained
models. Figure 2a and 2b show the white-box ASRs on
EnsAdv and NasNet respectively. For EnsAdv, we can see
that DCT Low improves ASR in the non-targeted case with
iterations = 1 and in the targeted case with iterations = 10,
but not in the non-targeted case with iterations = 10. How-
ever, in this case, DCT Low still outperforms other frequency
constraints and does not significantly deviate from uncon-
strained MIM’s performance. When the number of iterations
is large enough that unconstrained MIM can succeed consis-
tently, constraining the space only limits the attack, but oth-
erwise, the low frequency prior is effective. Therefore, low
frequency perturbations are more “iteration efficient”, as they
can be found more easily with a less exhaustive search, which
is practically helpful computationally.
However, for white-box attacks on NasNet in Figure 2b,
we see that although DCT Low still outperforms the other
frequency constraints, it does perform worse than uncon-
strained MIM. Comparing Figure 2a and 2b, it is clear that
DCT Low performs similarly against the adversarially trained
model as with the cleanly trained model, the difference here
is due to unconstrained MIM performing significantly better
against the cleanly trained model than against the adversari-
ally trained model. This implies that the low frequency prior
is useful against defended models, in particular, since it ex-
ploits the space where adversarial training, which is necessar-
ily imperfect, fails to reduce vulnerabilities.
DCT Low bypasses defenses prepended to the adversari-
ally trained model. As previously mentioned, in the grey-
box case, we generate the perturbations from the undefended
EnsAdv and use them to attack D1, D2, D3 and D4 (which in-
clude preprocessors prepended to EnsAdv). Figure 2c shows
the ASR results averaged over D1∼4. DCT Low outperforms
unconstrained MIM by large margins in all cases. Comparing
Figure 2a with Figure 2c, the larger difference between un-
constrained MIM and DCT Low in the grey-box case reflects
the fact that the top NeurIPS 2017 defenses are not nearly
as effective against low frequency perturbations as they are
against standard unconstrained attacks. In fact, DCT Low
yields the same ASR on D1, the winning defense submis-
sion in the NeurIPS 2017 competition, as on the adversarially
trained model without the preprocessor prepended; the pre-
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Figure 3: Transferability matrices with attack success rates (ASRs),
comparing unconstrained MIM with low frequency constrained
DCT Low (n = 128) in the non-targeted case. First row is with
iterations = 1, second is with iterations = 10. The column Cln is
NasNet, Adv is EnsAdv.
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Figure 4: Transferability matrices with attack relative difference in
ASR with the Cln model (first column). Rows and columns in each
subfigure is indexed in the same way as Figure 3.
processors are not effective (at all) at protecting the model
from low frequency perturbations, even in the targeted case,
where success is only yielded if the model is fooled to predict,
out of all 1000 class labels, the specified target label. Results
against the individual defenses are presented in the appendix.
DCT Low helps black-box transfer to defended models.
For assessing black-box transferability, we use Cln 1, Cln 3,
Adv 1, Adv 3 in Table 1 as the source models for generat-
ing perturbations, and attack EnsAdv and D1∼4, resulting in
20 source-target pairs in total. The average ASR results over
these pairs are reported in Figure 2d. In the non-targeted case,
we again see that DCT Low significantly outperforms uncon-
strained MIM. However, in the targeted case, constraining to
the low frequency subspace does not enable MIM to succeed
in transferring to distinct black-box defended models due to
the difficult nature of targeted transfer.
Next, we look at individual source-target pairs. For each
pair, we compare DCT Low (n = 128) with unconstrained
MIM in the non-targeted case with iterations = 1 and
iterations = 10. Results for all frequency configurations with
varied dimensionality are provided in the appendix. Figure 3
shows the transferability matrices for all source-target pairs,
where for each subplot, the row indices denote source models,
and the column indices denote target models. The value (and
associated color) in each gridcell represent the ASR for the
specified source-target pair. For Figure 4, the gridcell values
represent the relative difference in ASR between the target
model and the cleanly trained model (Cln)8, using the source
8The relative difference for the target model = (ASR on the target
model - ASR on Cln) / ASR on Cln.
model of the corresponding row.
Comparing (a) to (b) and (c) to (d) in Figure 3, it is clear
that low frequency perturbations are much more effective
than unconstrained MIM against defended models. Specif-
ically, we can see that DCT Low is significantly more effec-
tive than unconstrained MIM against EnsAdv, and D1∼4 pro-
vide almost no additional robustness to EnsAdv when low
frequency perturbations are applied.
DCT Low is not effective when transferring between unde-
fended cleanly trained models. However, we do observe
that DCT Low does not improve black-box transfer between
undefended cleanly trained models, which can be seen by
comparing indices (Cln 1,Cln) and (Cln 3,Cln) between Fig-
ure 3 (a) and (b), as well as (c) and (d). As discussed when
comparing white-box performance against cleanly trained
and adversarially trained models, low frequency constraints
are not generally more effective, but instead exploit the vul-
nerabilities in currently proposed defenses.
4.3 Effectiveness of Low Frequency on
Undefended Models v.s. Defended Models
In the last section, we showed that DCT Low is highly effec-
tive against adversarially trained models and top-performing
preprocessor-based defenses, in the white-box, grey-box and
black-box cases. However, low frequency does not help when
only cleanly trained models are involved, i.e. white-box on
clean models and black-box transfer between clean models.
To explain this phenomenon, we hypothesize that the state-
of-the-art ImageNet defenses considered here do not reduce
vulnerabilities within the low frequency subspace, and thus
DCT Low is roughly as effective against defended models as
Original Unconstrained (MIM) Low_256 Low_128 Low_64 Low_32
Figure 5: Adversarial examples generated with `∞  = 16/255 distortion
Original Unconstrained (MIM) Low_256 Low_128 Low_64 Low_32
Figure 6: Adversarial examples generated with `∞  = 32/255 distortion
against clean models, a property not seen when evaluating
with standard, unconstrained attacks.
This can be most clearly seen in Figure 4, which presents
the normalized difference between ASR on each of the tar-
get models with ASR on the cleanly trained model. The dif-
ference is consistently smaller for DCT Low than for uncon-
strained MIM, and nearly nonexistent when the perturbations
were generated against adversarially trained (defended) mod-
els (Adv 1,Adv 3). Thus, as discussed, defended models are
roughly as vulnerable as undefended models when encoun-
tered by low frequency perturbations.
4.4 Effectiveness of Low Frequency on CIFAR-10
We test the effectiveness of low frequency perturbations
on the much lower-dimensional than ImageNet, CIFAR-10
dataset (d = 299 to d = 32), attacking the state-of-the-
art adversarially trained model [Madry et al., 2017]. Ex-
periment results with 1000 test examples can be seen in Ta-
ble 2. Constraining the adversary used for training (non-
targeted PGD [Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017];
iterations = 10 and  = 8/255) with DCT Low, and eval-
uating both in the white-box and black-box settings (transfer
Dim White (Adv) Black (Adv) Black (Cln)
32 54.6 38.1 14.4
24 48.1 33.1 14.4
16 46.4 28.8 14.4
8 37.0 25.4 14.4
4 26.5 20.0 14.0
Table 2: Non-targeted attack success rate (ASR) with iterations =
10 and  = 8/255 of DCT Low in the white-box and black-box set-
tings (transfer from distinct adversarially trained and cleanly trained
models of the same architecture) against adversarially trained model
with 12.9% test error [Madry et al., 2017].
from distinct adversarially trained and cleanly trained models
of the same architecture), we observe that dimensionality re-
duction only hurts performance. This suggests that the notion
of low frequency perturbations is not only constrained to the
computer vision domain, but also only induces problems for
robustness in the realm of high-dimensional natural images.
5 Discussion
Our experiments show that the results seen in recent work
on the effectiveness of constraining the attack space to low
frequency components [Guo et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2018;
Sharma et al., 2018] are not due to generally reducing the size
of the attack search space. When evaluating against state-of-
the-art adversarially trained models and winning defense sub-
missions in the NeurIPS 2017 competition in the white-box,
grey-box, and black-box settings, significant improvements
are only yielded when low frequency components of the per-
turbation are preserved. Low frequency perturbations are so
effective that they render state-of-the-art ImageNet defenses
to be roughly as vulnerable as undefended, cleanly trained
models under attack.
However, we also noticed that low frequency perturbations
do not improve performance when defended models are not
involved, seen in evaluating white-box performance against
and black-box transfer between cleanly trained models. Low
frequency perturbations do not yield faster white-box attacks
on clean models, nor do they provide more effective transfer
between clean models.
Our results suggest that the state-of-the-art ImageNet de-
fenses, based on necessarily imperfect adversarial training,
only significantly reduce vulnerability outside of the low fre-
quency subspace, but not so much within. Against defenses,
low frequency perturbations are more effective than uncon-
strained ones since they exploit the vulnerabilities which pur-
portedly robust models share. Against undefended models,
constraining to a subspace of significantly reduced dimen-
sionality is unhelpful, since undefended models share vulner-
abilities beyond the low frequency subspace. Understanding
whether this observed vulnerability in defenses is caused by
an intrinsic difficulty to being robust in the low frequency
subspace, or simply due to the (adversarial) training proce-
dure rarely sampling from the low frequency region is an in-
teresting direction for further work.
Low frequency perturbations are perceptible (under `∞-
norm  = 16/255). Our results show that the robustness
of currently proposed ImageNet defenses relies on the as-
sumption that adversarial perturbations are high frequency in
nature. Though the adversarial defense problem is not con-
strained to achieving robustness to imperceptible perturba-
tions, this is a reasonable first step. Thus, in Figure 5, we
visualize low frequency constrained adversarial examples un-
der the competition `∞-norm constraint  = 16/255. Though
the perturbations do not significantly change human percep-
tual judgement, e.g. the top example still appears to be a
standing woman, the perturbations with n ≤ 128 are indeed
perceptible.
Although it is well-known that `p-norms (in input space)
are far from metrics aligned with human perception, exem-
plified by their widespread use, it is still assumed that with a
small enough bound (e.g. `∞  = 16/255), the resulting ball
will constitute a subset of the imperceptible region. The fact
that low frequency perturbations are fairly visible challenges
this common belief. In addition, if the goal is robustness to
imperceptible perturbations, our study suggests this might be
achieved, without adversarial training, by relying on low fre-
quency components, yielding a much more computationally
practical training procedure. In all, we hope our study encour-
ages researchers to not only consider the frequency space,
but perceptual priors in general, when bounding perturbations
and proposing tractable, reliable defenses.
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A Construction Process
For a specified reduced dimensionality n, and original dimen-
sionality d, we consider the frequency subspace Rn×n. For
the low frequency domain, DCT Low, we preserve compo-
nents vi,j if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
For the high frequency domain, DCT High, we do the op-
posite, masking the lowest frequency components such that
n2 components are preserved: 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d(1 − rh). Thus
rhd bands (rows/columns in V ) are preserved. To ensure the
number of preserved components is equal between the differ-
ently constructed masks, we specify rl = nd , and solve the
following equation for rh:
d2 − (1− rh)2d2 = r2l d2
1− (1− rh)2 = r2l
2rh − r2h = r2l
r2h − 2rh + r2l = 0
(3)
Solving the quadratic equation for 0 ≤ rh ≤ 1, rh = 1 −√
4(1−r2l )
2 .
For the middle frequency band, DCT Mid, we would like
to ensure we mask an equal number of low and high fre-
quency components. We thus solve the following equation
for rml:
r2mld
2 =
d2 − r2l d2
2
rml =
√
1− r2l
2
(4)
Thus, we mask components vi,j if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ rmld, and
if d(1 − rmh) ≤ i, j ≤ d. Compute rmh from rml with
equation 3.
For our representative random frequency mask,
DCT Random, much like DCT High, rows/columns
are chosen, except in this case randomly rather than the
highest frequency bands. To ensure that n2 components are
preserved, rhd rows/columns are chosen, which are then
preserved in both the x and y directions.
B Spatial Smoothing &
Downsampling-Upsampling Filters
In the main paper, we show that DCT Low significantly
outperforms all other frequency configurations (DCT High,
DCT Mid, DCT Random) in the white-box, grey-box, and
black-box settings. Specifically, we observed that DCT Low
generates effective perturbations faster than without con-
straint on adversarially trained models (but not so on clean
models), bypasses defenses prepended to the adversarially
trained model, helps black-box transfer to defended models,
but is not effective when transferring between undefended
cleanly trained models. We observe mirrored results when
constraining the perturbation with both spatial smoothing and
downsampling-upsampling filters; shown in Figure 7 and 8.
For the downsampling-upsampling filter, we resize the per-
turbation with bilinear interpolation, and decrease the dimen-
sionality from 299 to 32, as with DCT Low. For the spatial
smoothing filter, we smooth the perturbation with a gaussian
filter of fixed kernel size (7x7), decreasing the standard devi-
ation to strengthen the constraint. As can be seen, despite the
differing parameters, the trends of each of the low frequency
perturbation methods are the same.
C Complete Heatmap
We summarize our attack success rate results with DCT Low
in Figure 9. The rows correspond to sources, and columns
corresponds to targets. The sources include [Cln, Adv, Cln 1,
Adv 1, Cln 3, Adv 3], where Cln is NasNetLarge 331,
Adv is EnsAdvInceptionResNetV2; Cln 1, Adv 1,
Cln 3, Adv 3 are summarized in the main text. The tar-
gets include [Cln, Adv, D1, D2, D3, D4], where D1∼4 are
defenses summarized in the main text. Thus (Cln,Cln) and
(Adv,Adv) summarize white-box results, (Adv,D1∼4) sum-
marizes grey-box results, and the rest of the entries summa-
rize black-box results. Note that the low frequency configu-
ration is DCT Low with n = 128.
D All Plots
Figure 10 shows white-box results using DCT Low attacking
the adversarially trained model. Figures 11-14 shows results
against D1, D2, D3, and D4, respectively. Figures [15-19,
20-24, 25-29, 30-34] shows results transferring from each of
the source models [Cln 1,Cln 3,Adv 1,Adv 3] to each of the
target defenses [EnsAdv,D1,D2,D3,D4].
Figure 35 shows white-box results attacking the cleanly
trained model. Figures 36-39 show black-box results trans-
ferring from the source models to the cleanly trained model
[Cln].
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(a) White-box attack on adversarially trained model, EnsAdv.
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(b) White-box attack on standard cleanly trained model, NasNet.
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(c) Grey-box attack on top-4 NeurIPS 2017 defenses prepended to
adversarially trained model.
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(d) Black-box attack on sources transferred to defenses (EnsAdv +
D1∼4)
Figure 7: Spatial Smoothing filter; number of iterations in parentheses, non-targeted with  = 16/255, targeted with  = 32/255.
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(a) White-box attack on adversarially trained model, EnsAdv.
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(b) White-box attack on standard cleanly trained model, NasNet.
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(c) Grey-box attack on top-4 NeurIPS 2017 defenses prepended to
adversarially trained model.
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(d) Black-box attack on sources transferred to defenses (EnsAdv +
D1∼4)
Figure 8: Downsampling-Upsampling filter; number of iterations in parentheses, non-targeted with  = 16/255, targeted with  = 32/255.
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Figure 9: Transferability matrix comparing standard unconstrained MIM with low frequency constrained DCT Low (n = 128). First, second,
and third rows are non-targeted with iterations = 1, non-targeted with iterations = 10, and targeted with iterations = 10
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(a) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 1.
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(b) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 10.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 10: White-box attack on adversarially trained model.
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(a) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 1.
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(b) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 10.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 11: Grey-box attack on D1.
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(a) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 1.
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(b) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 10.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 12: Grey-box attack on D2.
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(a) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 1.
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(b) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 10.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 13: Grey-box attack on D3.
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(a) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 1.
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(b) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 10.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 14: Grey-box attack on D4.
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(a) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 1.
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(b) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 10.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 15: Black-box attack from Cln 1 to EnsAdv.
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(a) Non-targeted with  = 16 and
iterations = 1.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 16: Black-box attack from Cln 1 to D1.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 17: Black-box attack from Cln 1 to D2.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 18: Black-box attack from Cln 1 to D3.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 19: Black-box attack from Cln 1 to D4.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 20: Black-box attack from Cln 3 to EnsAdv.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 21: Black-box attack from Cln 3 to D1.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 22: Black-box attack from Cln 3 to D2.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 23: Black-box attack from Cln 3 to D3.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 24: Black-box attack from Cln 3 to D4.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 25: Black-box attack from Adv 1 to EnsAdv.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 26: Black-box attack from Adv 1 to D1.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 27: Black-box attack from Adv 1 to D2.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 28: Black-box attack from Adv 1 to D3.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 29: Black-box attack from Adv 1 to D4.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 30: Black-box attack from Adv 3 to EnsAdv.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 31: Black-box attack from Adv 3 to D1.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 32: Black-box attack from Adv 3 to D2.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 33: Black-box attack from Adv 3 to D3.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 34: Black-box attack from Adv 3 to D4.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 35: White-box attack on cleanly trained model.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 36: Black-box attack from Cln 1 to Cln.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 37: Black-box attack from Cln 3 to Cln.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 38: Black-box attack from Adv 1 to Cln.
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(c) Targeted with  = 32 and iterations =
10.
Figure 39: Black-box attack from Adv 3 to Cln.
